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1 
ARGUMENTS 
1. Appellant Sevy does not assert that a "permanent impairment" entitles her 
to a "disability". Sevy asserts that once the Commission determined she 
suffered a permanent impairment, it cannot evaluate disability from a premise 
that the accident did nothing to increase her permanent limitations/restrictions. 
2. Sevy' s appeal is well grounded in the facts, warranted by the existing statutory 
definitions of"permanent impairment" and "permanent disability evaluation", 
and is brought in good faith and not for an improper purpose. 
INTRODUCTION 
Neither the Employer/SIF nor the ISIF presented any argument on the issue specifically 
raised by Sevy. The ISIF' s argument attempts to redirect the Court away from the lynch pin issue 
raised by Sevy by completely stating an entirely different issue. In their brief Employer/SIF did 
nothing more than copy, word for word, the Commission's Findings of Fact (Br. pp. 4-19) and 
their own statement of facts argued to the Commission. (Br. pp. 21-29). 
The arguments of the ISIF and the Employer/SIF will be addressed separately. 
ARGUMENT! 
ISIF's Argument 
ISIF asserts that Sevy claims that she is "entitled to disability over and above 
impairment."(emphasis added). ISIF Br. p. 8. It argues that the AMA Guides recognize that an 
impaired individual may or may not have a disability and that a permanent impairment rating is 
not a direct determination of the existence of disability. ISIF Br. p. 9. 
Sevy's Response to ISIF 
ISIF misrepresents what Sevy claims. Sevy does not claim she is entitled to disability 
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because she suffered a physical impairment and received an impairment rating from the 
Commission. 
Sevy does claim that the Commission's award of a permanent impairment rating 
establishes, by definition, that she has a physical abnormality or loss, e.g. physical 
restrictions/limitations. Sevy does claim that the Commission, after awarding her an impairment 
rating, cannot adopt Dr. Larson's opinion that her accident "did nothing to increase her 
permanent restriction/limitation" and then find that she did not suffer any disability. R. p. 93. 
A permanent ii11pairment evaluation is a medical appraisal of the nature and extent of the 
injury as it affects an injured employee's personal efficiency in the activities of daily living, such 
as self-care, communication, normal living postures, ambulation, elevation, traveling, and 
nonspecialized activities of bodily members. LC. 72-424; Thom v. Callahan, 97 Idaho 151, 540 
P.2d 1330 (1975). Physician opinions are only advisory. The Commission is the ultimate 
evaluator of impairment. Urry v. Walker & Fox Masonry Contractors, 115 Idaho 750, 769 P.2d 
1122 (1989). 
The :fundamental prerequisite to the Commission awarding a permanent impairment 
rating is that it must first find that the worker's injury caused a permanent physical abnormality 
or loss that affects an injured employee's personal efficiency in the activities of daily living, such 
as self-care, communications, normal living postures, ambulation, elevation, traveling, and 
nonspecialized activities of bodily members. LC. 72-422; Thom v. Callahan, 97 Idaho 151, 540 
P.2d 1330 (1975). The Commission's determination that Sevy suffered of a permanent 
impairment and determined its rating means, by definition, that Sevy suffered a ratable physical 
physical abnormality or loss that affected her personal efficiency in the activities of daily living, 
such as self-care, communications, normal living postures, ambulation, elevation, traveling, and 
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nonspecialized activities of bodily members. Having so found, it is completely contradictory, 
and not supported by substantial competent evidence, for the Commission to utilize Dr. Larson's 
opinion, that Sevy' s accident did nothing to increase her permanent limitations/restrictions, as 
the basis for its finding she did not suffer a disability. 
The Commission's Order Denying Reconsideration spotlights the err of its analysis: 
1. "except for a 2% PPI rating, the subject accident did not contribute to Claimant's 
disability from all causes combined." R. p. 89. 
2. "This conclusion [ of no disability is] derived from the Commission's adoption of the 
opinion expressed by Dr. Larson that the subject accident did nothing to increase 
Claimant's permanent limitations/restrictions." R. p. 89-90. 
3. "Central to the Commission's original decision [of no disability] is the opinion of Dr. 
Larson, Claimant's treating physician." R. p. 93. 
4. "The Commission found persuasive his [Dr. Larson's] testimony that while the subject 
accident is responsible for causing or contributing to the failure of the CS-6 fusion, 
the accident did nothing to increase Claimant's permanent limitations/restrictions." 
R. p. 93. 
5. Dr. Larson's answer when asked "So there were no new limitations, restrictions just 
because of the fusion redo?" was, "No." R. P. 96. 
The Commission's finding that "except for a 2% PPI rating" Sevy's injury "did nothing 
to increase Claimant's permanent limitations/restrictions", conflicts with its finding that she 
suffered a permanent physical impairment which by definition requires a physical abnormality or 
loss that affects an injured employee's personal efficiency in the activities of daily living. The 
finding of a ratable impairment cannot be viewed as a benevolent 'gift' to Sevy and then 
existence rejected in an evaluation of disability. An impairment rating is not just an abstract 
percentage so that a claimant can receive a minimal monetary benefit. To the contrary, an 
impairment rating is the basis by which an identified and specific "loss, loss of use, or 
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derangement of any body part, organ system, organ :function" is quantified. AMA Guides to the 
Evaluation of Permanent Impairment, Fifth Edition, p. 2 
In order for the Commission to have found that Sevy did not suffer any 
restrictions/impairments from her industrial injury, and thus did not suffer any disability, it 
would have had to have found that Sevy did not suffer any physical abnormality or loss from her 
industrial injury beyond that which she had prior to the accident. In essence, no 
restrictions/impairments requires a finding of no ratable physical impairment. 
An "Evaluation (rating) of permanent disability" starts with the existence of the 
prerequisite physical abnormality or loss from the industrial injury, the physical impairment 
upon which the impairment rating is based, and then the evaluation is to proceed to determine 
whether the physical abnormality or loss, in conjunction with non-medical factors, has reduced 
the claimant's capacity for gainful employment. LC. §72-425; Graybill v. Swift & Co., 115 
Idaho 293, 294, 766 P.2d 763, 764 (1988). Inexplicably the Commission, instead of proceeding 
with the existent restrictions/limitations inherent in Sevy's impairment rating, began and ended 
its disability evaluation by sub silentio rejecting her ratable impairment and, by adopting Dr. 
Larson's opinion, finding that she did not have any restrictions/limitations and thus no disability. 
Once the Commission finds a claimant has suffered a physical abnormality or loss, a 
ratable impairment, the Commission is statutorily required to take the restrictions and limitations 
upon which it awarded the rating and evaluate how, in conjunction with her non-medical factors, 
an injured worker's capacity for gainful employment has been reduced. J.C. §72-425. The 
Commission erred by rejecting its finding of a ratable impairment and finding that "except for a 
[ apparently meaningless] 2% PPI" did not suffer any limitations/restrictions because of her 
industrial injury. 
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This matter should be remanded to the Commission so, starting with the specifics of 
Sevy's physical abnormality or loss, the Commission can properly evaluate her disability. ISIF's 
argument that Sevry is "not totally and permanently disabled and thus the ISIF has no liability", is 
not ripe for review. On remand the Commission must commence its disability evaluation from 
the starting point that she did suffer impairments/restrictions and proceed to determine the extent 
that they, in conjunction with her non-medical factors, reduce her capacity for gainful 
employment. 
ISIF's argues that Sevy is "not totally and permanently disabled and thus the ISIF has no 
liability." Br. p. 9. Whether or not Sevy is totally and permanently disabled and the extent, if 
any of ISIF's liability, is not ripe for evaluation until the Commission begins its evaluation from 
the starting point that Sevy suffered a physical restriction/limitation. Unless Sevy' s disability 
evaluation commences from that starting point, there literally cannot be an evaluation of how the 
abnormality/loss she suffered, in conjunction with her non-medical factors, affects her capacity 
for gainful employment. 
Seyy's Response to Employer/SIF 
Rather than making an argument, the Employer/SIF merely cut the Commission's 
Findings of Fact and their factual assertions before the Commission into their brief on appeal. 
They do not attempt to redirect the Court to a different issue. Instead they ignore the issue raised 
by Sevy and implicitly argue that the 24 pages of facts in their appellate brief are substantial 
competent evidence on any issue. If they had cited to the Record/Exhibits, instead of cutting and 
pasting, their brief would have been about four pages, including cover sheet, long. 
Sevy requests that the Court address whether the award of an physical impairment rating 
means something more than an amount of monetary benefits. It is respectfully submitted, if the 
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Court reviews issue raised by Sevy, that the Commission's decision and orders will be 
reversed and this matter remanded to the Commission for it to undertake a disability evaluation. 
ARGUMENT2 
Sevy' s appeal is well grounded in the facts, warranted by the existing statutory 
definitions of "permanent impairment" and "permanent disability evaluation", 
and is brought in good faith and not for an improper purpose. 
The reason this appeal has been pursued is that the Commission's finding that Sevy 
suffered a ratable physical impairment is inherently contrary to its finding that she did not suffer 
disability because she did not suffer a restriction/impairment from her injury. It is respectfully 
submitted that the Commission's. decision failed to follow the statutory definition of "permanent 
impairment" and failed to undertake a proper permanent disability evaluation. 
At the time of her industrial injury on October 21, 2006, Sevy was forty-three (43) years 
old. She is now fifty-one (51) years old. At the time of her industrial injury Sevy was gainfully 
employed and she was fully performing her job. Dr. Larson, after performing surgery on Sevy, 
referred her for a Functional Capacities Evaluation (FCE) to determine whether she had any 
permanent work restrictions. R. p. 66. The FCE was conducted on August 1, 2007. The FCE test 
results documented that she could not return to her time of accident job. Immediately after the 
FCE, Dr. Larson informed the Industrial Commission Rehabilitation Division (ICRD) that he 
agreed with them and that Sevy could not return to her time of injury job. Larson Depo. p. 42-43. 
After the FCE, the Employer informed the ICRD that "there is no work for Kelli". Tr. p. 209. 
The ICRD did not provide her with any assistance finding a job, basically because its closure 
notes erroneously stated that she did not wish help from the ICRD and that she "is currently 
employed." T. p. 268. 
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Sevy wanted the ICRD's assistance and she was not employed. Dan Brownell, a 29 year 
ICRD employee and supervisor, testified that he was present at the ICRD meeting where it was 
decided that Sevy would not receive assistance and her file would be closed because a 
rehabilitation consultant had quit, the Coeur d'Alene ICRD office was thus short staffed, and her 
file had to be closed. T. p. 270-271. 
After Sevy was told by Employer that it had no job for her and the ICRD closed her file 
without providing her any assistance, other than a short stint being paid under a special welfare 
program for her to watch her grandchildren for a few hours a day, she has not able to obtain any 
employment. Sevy's lack of education and low grade level equivalent as determined by her 
T ABE results, in conjunction with her physical limitations eliminated her from 99% of the jobs 
in the national labor market, let alone her depressed Silver Valley labor market. There was 
literally no way that Sevy, after her industrial accident, would be able to access a job in her labor 
market. No actual open jobs were identified that she could compete for and obtain. Add. Doc. 
Clmt Opening Brief, p. 20; Id. pp. 13-24. 
It is respectfully submitted that it would be unconscionable to not seek this Court's 
review of the Commission's failure to undertake a proper disability evaluation after it found 
Sevy suffered a permanent physical impairment and awarded her a rating. To not seek this 
Court's review would be to not provide her with her one last opportunity to receive benefits that 
her undersigned counsel believes she should receive under a proper application of the applicable 
statutes. 
This appeal was brought in a good faith effort to provide this Court with the opportunity 
to carefully review the Commission's failure to statutorily evaluate Sevy's disability. It is no 
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secret that attorneys represent injured workers such as Sevy under contingency fee agreements. 
This appeal and briefing was certainly not undertaken for her attorney's financial gain. 
It is unfathomable to Sevy' s undersigned attorney how asking this Court to review the 
Commission's determination, in an effort to have this Court require the Commission to 
undertake a proper statutory disability evaluation of an injured Idaho worker who suffered an 
industrial accident and injury and thereafter became financially destitute and unemployable, can 
be considered as being undertaken for an improper purpose. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully requested that this Court reverse and remand this matter to the 
Commission, in order that it will acknowledge the fact that Sevy' s industrial injury caused 
physical abnormality and loss means more than just a rating, and direct the Commission to 
conduct a proper disability evaluation. It is further respectfully requested, in the event that the 
Court does not reverse and remand, that the Court deny Respondents requests for an award of 
attorney fees. 
Starr Kelso, Attorney for Appellant Sevy 
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